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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1495 
 ___________ 
 
 EMELIA M. SEGRETI, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BOROUGH OF WILKINSBURG; LT. MICHELE KREMPATSKY;  
MAYOR JOHN THOMPSON; MICHELE KENNY, SECRETARY 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 09-CV-01511) 
 Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Robert C. Mitchell
*
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 6, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 11, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                                 
1 * Both parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge 
Mitchell pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 536 and Fed. R. Civ. 73.  
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 Emelia Segreti appeals pro se from the order of the District Court dismissing her 
complaint.  We will affirm the District Court‟s rulings, but will remand for the entry of an 
additional order as discussed below.  
I. 
Segreti filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Borough of Wilkinsburg and 
several of its current and former employees and later filed a first and second amended 
complaint.  She claims that she and her daughter were assaulted by a group of people in 
February of 2004 and that defendants took inadequate measures to identify and prosecute 
those involved.  She further alleges that, during her efforts to obtain justice, certain 
defendants filed false charges of disorderly conduct against her in 2005 (for using 
profanity at a council meeting) and 2007 (for conduct in the Borough building).  She 
concedes that she was found guilty of these charges, but maintains that her convictions 
were based on false testimony.  She also claims that a non-defendant police officer 
prevented her from voting in November 2007 by preventing her from entering the 
Borough building.  Finally, she claims that Defendant Kenny (also a police officer) 
harassed her at a gas station in 2008 and filed false charges of harassment against her that 
were dismissed on June 9, 2009, when Kenny and another police officer failed to appear 
at trial.  For relief, Segreti seeks damages for emotional distress. 
 By order entered May 13, 2010, the District Court dismissed Segreti‟s complaint 
against the Borough and Kenny under Rule 12(b)(6) on their motion and on multiple 
 3 
 
grounds.  The District Court later directed Segreti to seek a default judgment against the 
remaining defendants (Krempatsky and Thompson) or show cause why the action should 
not be dismissed.  Segreti filed a motion for a default judgment, which the District Court 
denied.  Then, by order entered January 26, 2011, the District Court dismissed Segreti‟s 
complaint against the remaining defendants on their motion and again on multiple 
grounds.  Segreti appeals.
1
 
II. 
 The District Court properly construed Segreti‟s allegations and thoroughly 
explained why they do not state a federal claim.  In particular, the District Court properly 
determined that Segreti‟s federal claims are barred by the statute of limitations, barred by 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), or otherwise fail to state a claim as a matter of 
law.  Segreti raises no colorable challenge to those rulings in her brief.  After reviewing 
her complaints de novo, we agree with the District Court‟s reasoning and need not 
reiterate it here. 
                                                 
1
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Although Segreti mentions only the 
January 26 ruling in her pro se notice of appeal, we will liberally construe it along 
with her brief to seek review of the District Court‟s previous orders as well.  We 
review the District Court‟s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.  See Mayer v. 
Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010).  In doing so, “[w]e must accept all 
factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light 
favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled 
to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.”  Id.  The complaint must 
contain “„factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.‟”  Id. (citation omitted).  We 
review the denial of a motion for default judgment for abuse of discretion.  See 
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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One issue, however, requires remand for limited further proceedings.  Segreti 
claims that defendant Kenny maliciously prosecuted her by filing the harassment charges 
that were dismissed in 2009.  The District Court correctly concluded that Segreti did not 
state a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 because she did not allege the 
requisite deprivation of liberty.  See Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Deprivation of liberty, however, is not a required element of malicious 
prosecution under Pennsylvania state law.  See id. at 186 & n.2.  The District Court did 
not address whether Segreti‟s allegations state such a claim for federal pleading purposes.  
Liberally construing Segreti‟s second amended complaint, we believe they do.  See id.   
We recognize that Segreti‟s complaints mention only § 1983 and do not expressly 
assert a claim under Pennsylvania state law.  Ordinarily, we might not fault the District 
Court for failing to consider such a claim in the absence of a valid federal claim or other 
basis for federal jurisdiction.
2
  In this case, however, it appears that the two-year statute 
of limitations on a state-law claim for malicious prosecution has run during the pendency 
of Segreti‟s federal proceeding.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(1).  In the absence of a 
further order, that circumstance might prevent Segreti from asserting a potentially 
meritorious claim in state court.  Thus, we will remand for the District Court to enter an 
                                                 
2
 Because the District Court did not address whether Segreti had asserted a state-law 
claim, it necessarily did not consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over such a claim.  Remand for consideration of that issue is not necessary, however, 
because the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction after the dismissal of Segreti‟s 
federal claims at this stage plainly was not warranted.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 
Angst v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530, 1535 (3d Cir. 1992).   
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order dismissing Segreti‟s second amended complaint, to the extent it can be read to 
assert a state-law claim of malicious prosecution, for lack of jurisdiction.  That ruling will 
permit Segreti to file the claim in state court retroactive to the date she filed her second 
amended complaint in federal court.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5103(b); Angst, 969 F.2d at 
1534-35; McLaughlin v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426, 430-31 (3d Cir. 1983).  We 
emphasize that we take this step only in light of Segreti‟s pro se status in case she 
intended to assert such a claim and now wishes to proceed with it in state court. 
 Finally, Segreti appears to take issue with the District Court‟s denial of her motion 
for a default judgment.  We perceive no abuse of discretion in that regard.  Although the 
District Court did not explain why it denied the motion, Krempatsky‟s and Thompson‟s 
response in opposition set forth the relevant factors and none of them weighs in favor of 
entering a default.  See Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164.  In particular, Segreti was not 
prejudiced by those defendants‟ delay in responding, there is no indication that they were 
culpable, and they had a litigable defense.  See id.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court, but will remand 
for the entry of an additional order consistent with this opinion. 
